In this paper, I investigate how Shaykh al-MufÐd approached juristic authority or delegacy in early ShiÝi thought in the fourth/tenth century. I explore ShiÝi juristic authority in light of the doctrine of deputyship to suggest that deputyship and therefore the juristic authority that is based upon it were apolitical in MufÐd's approach. There is no clear evidence in MufÐd's writings that he regarded the jurists as possessing both the power to judge in the community and to administer the affairs of its members -that is to be a political leader. Deputyship for MufÐd is limited to judgeship.
Introduction
The fourth/tenth century ShiÝi theologian and jurist al-Shaykh al-MufÐd (d. 413/1022) discusses juristic authority in his main works. 1 Because of his influence in ShiÝi intellectual history, al-MufÐd is an ideal case for exploring the quest for juristic authority and the nature of leadership in early ShiÝi community. As a theologian, MufÐd played a significant role in the consolidation of ShiÝi post-occultation theology, in which the doctrine of occultation is a central point. As a jurist, Mufīd was also a religious leader of the ShiÝi community of his time. He represents a turning point in the transition from the traditionalist school of Qum -the main figures of which were al-Kulaynī (d. 329/941) and Shaykh al-Ṣadūq (d. 381/991) -to the rationalist school of Baghdad, of which he was the main representative.
I argue that in the period MufÐd lived and for some time after, deputyship, leadership, or juristic authority remained apolitical. Despite progress in establishing itself as a sect with its own intellectual heritage, the Twelver ShiÝi community suffered from straitened political circumstances. The minority status of ShiÝism and lack of access to political power influenced views of politics and reduced the ambit of deputyship to non-political affairs. Moreover, it is understandable that, in the earliest period of the occultation, a majority of ShiÝi scholars favoured the apoliticality of deputyship due to a sense that claiming political authority would trespass on the Imam's exclusive right.
Thus, for MufÐd, the deputyship of the jurists during the occultation is not political. He left silent the vital subject of political leadership in the ShiÝi community during the ghaybah. He did not consider the jurists as political leaders or authorities during that period. Mufid just gives jurists judicial authority, and he mentions two categories of jurists (al-fuqahÁ' or ÎukÁm) and amirs (al-umarÁÞ) as the Imam's appointees who have the authority to enforce ÎudÙd; in the meantime, the amirs are responsible for administrative, political affairs too. State-building is part of the mission of a political leader; at least, Mufid should have discussed it theoretically. MufÐd neither produced an intellectual basis for a ShiÝi state or emirate led by the ShiÝi jurists, nor did he himself act politically, as a jurist. 2 In the first part of his chief legal treatise al-MuqniÝah, he addresses only topics of religious law such as purity (ÔahÁrah), daily prayers, fasting, religious taxes, and the pilgrimage to Mecca.
3 Public matters such as the state or the army are not addressed. Although delegation by the Imam was a known concept, MufÐd does not employ the conceptual term niyÁbah and uses the concrete word nÁÞib (deputy) only four times in his extant writings. These words are also rarely used by others, and not at all by al-Shaykh al-ÑadÙq, MufÐd's illustrious predecessor and teacher. MufÐd does speak of deputization in administration of the QurÞanic legal punishments or ÎudÙd, likely because their application would have stood as a symbol of the continued existence of ShiÝi law. Apparently in response to the community's lack of political power, he also justifies the co-operation of ShiÝi jurists and amirs with 'unjust' (i.e. non-ShiÝi rulers). His justification for ShiÝi scholars working as functionaries for the ÝAbbÁsid caliphs and other Sunni political powers was taken up by other scholars after him, who essentially repeated his view. 4 It is reasonable to suppose that the belief in the near return of the Twelfth Imam, the MahdÐ, was a factor in limiting deputyship and pushing it toward a quite narrow range of functions. Since the ShiÝis expected the Imam to return very soon, there was no need to discuss putting political arrangements in place during the Imam's absence.
In MufÐd's time, the ÝAbbÁsid caliphs dominated the political system and applied Sunni law, while the sons of AbÙ ShujÁÝ DaylamÐ, the ShiÝi Buwayhid dynasty, 5 were in their service, holding the title of Commander of the Commanders (amÐr al-umarÁÞ), a military title with executive power. The HamdÁnids in the northern part of Iraq were another ShiÝi dynasty working for the ÝAbbÁsid caliphs. Thus circumstances were relatively favourable for the Twelver ShiÝi community, and the ShiÝi-Sunni relationship was also relatively stable. The BÙyid dynasty promoted ShiÝi religious ceremonies such as Ashura, which took place in public space in Baghdad, the centre of the Sunni caliphate, in 352/962, 6 and ÝEid al-GhadÐr 7 commemorating ÝAlÐ's imamate. The BÙyids did not, however, play sectarian politics against the majority Sunni population. As for MufÐd's relations with the BÙyids, they were mostly friendly, though he was at one point exiled from Baghdad by them because of Sunni-ShiÝi unrest.
MufÐd stands as a leading theologian and jurist not only in his time, but long after. His main book in law is al-MuqniÝah. The MuqniÝah was expanded and commented upon by Shaykh al-ÓÙsÐ (460/1068), MufÐd's prominent pupil, under the title TahdhÐb al-AÎkÁm, which became one of the main four ShiÝi legal sources. From a political perspective, MufÐd is an apolitical representative of early ShiÝi thought, though in the twentieth century, there was an attempt to redefine him as the pioneer of the guardianship of the jurist.
Contemporary politicization of the image of MufÐd
I contend that juristic authority -deputyship or niyÁbah -was originally not political, and only became so gradually and rather late -that is, only in the eighteenth century under the QÁjÁrs. There has been a drive, however, to portray deputyship as political so that it may serve as a basis for the modern doctrine of guardianship of the jurist or wilÁyat al-faqÐh. For instance, in 1413/1992, a 'Millennium International Congress' on Shaykh MufÐd was held by the seminary school of Qum, Iran, following which his extant works were (re-) published along with several articles submitted to the Congress. The Congress, unfortunately, was an effort to politicize MufÐd, specifically to cast him as a proponent of Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of wilÁyat al-faqÐh. Contrary to ShÁkÙrÐ's claims, however, MufÐd never uses the term 'guardianship of the jurist' or discusses anything like it. Nor does he broach the necessity of establishing a ShiÝi state. MufÐd did not tell ShiÝis to support a system created by the jurists. Far from being a political activist, he held that it is permissible and even in some circumstances obligatory to work for an unjust ruler. ShÁkÙrÐ does not provide any proof for his claim and no reference to a source. He refers to developments in ShiÝi jurisprudence between the time of ÑadÙq and MufÐd, i.e. from the traditionist school of Qum to the more rationalist school of Baghdad as involving politics, but the shift in fact occurred mostly in methodology and certainly not in the approach to politics. ÑadÙq and MufÐd were both apolitical.
ShÁkÙrÐ quotes a lengthy passage from the KitÁb al-ÍudÙd (the chapter on QurÞanic punishments) of MufÐd's MuqniÝah and then comments as follows:
It is individually incumbent (wÁjib ÝaynÐ) upon one who has obtained power (ghalabah yÁft) and become caliph and amir, as well as anyone appointed by such a person, to administer the QurÞanic punishments (ÎudÙd), enforce the shariÝah, encourage good and forbid the evil […] .
The issue of jurists administering QurÞanic punishments will be discussed in detail later on, but very briefly, it must be said that the quotation is not accurate. MufÐd writes about the necessity of observing ÎudÙd by a ShiÝi jurist appointed by a non-ShiÝi ruler, not a ShiÝi person such as a jurist possessing the power to appoint someone else. There are two very evident tendencies in ShÁkÙrÐ's interpretation of MufÐd's views about politics and the relation between ShiÝi jurists and 'unjust' rulers. First, he tries to prove that political deputyship has long and strong roots among prominent ShiÝi jurists. Second, he undermines the idea of working for an unjust ruler, obviously with the conditions of prerevolutionary Iran in mind.
AÎmad ÀdharÐ QummÐ is even more eager than ShÁkÙrÐ to politicize deputyship. He states with apparent certainty that MufÐd is the first jurist to introduce the theory of guardianship, especially in his MuqniÝah, and adds that he tried to strengthen the intellectual basis for it. 10 He does not, however, tell us where this is stated in the MuqniÝah or any other of MufÐd's writings. ÀdharÐ QummÐ cites prayer leadership on the two ÝEids, prayers for rain, and prayers in the event of a lunar or solar eclipse as evidence that MufÐd propounded niyÁbah.
11 Apart from these being quite minor functions, the jurists are actually asked, in MufÐd's telling, to lead the prayer as a general duty of a religious figure, but not as something delegated by the Imam. From MufÐd's view on enjoining good and forbidding evil, the execution of legal penalties, and the necessity of paying alms (zakÁt) to the ShiÝi jurists, ÀdharÐ QummÐ, astonishingly, infers 'absolute guardianship of the jurist' (wilÁyat-i muÔlaqah-i faqÐh) from al-Mufid's works. 12 His argument is that absolute power or sulÔÁn in the above-mentioned cases refers to the Prophet and the Imams; and since during the occultation, the jurists function as the deputy of the Imam, their authority is absolute. 13 ÀdharÐ QummÐ does not stop there, for, based again supposedly on MufÐd, he takes the jurists to actually themselves be the 'sulÔÁn al-Islam'.
It is not my goal here to respond to ÀdharÐ QummÐ's or ShÁkÙrÐ's understandings of Shaykh MufÐd; rather I only wish to show how his works have been subject to distortion and misunderstanding. Before proceeding to the main topic, I will present an overview of some key terms and concepts necessary to continue.
The Arabic terms sulÔÁn, nÁÞib, ÎÁkim, amir, wÁlÐ, nÁÛir, and ÝÁmil are key to understanding niyÁbah. Their meanings have developed and changed from MufÐd's time to now. These shifts are significant enough that they have facilitated quite different interpretations. As always with dense juristic and theological texts, it is necessary to pay close attention to Arabic usage. Therefore in this article, I will analyse how these terms were used in MufÐd's time.
NÁÞib, the general sense of which is 'representative' or 'deputy', refers specifically to the person to whom the Imam deputizes his functions during his occultation. In his chief legal work MuqniÝah, MufÐd uses nÁÞib five times. In this early period, however, nÁÞib was meant in a general and not in the specialized, technical sense we see later of deputyship of the Imam. ÑadÙq does not use the term at all in his four-volume legal compendium, Man LÁ YaÎÃuruhu al-FaqÐh or in his al-MuqniÝ.
14 In al-FuÒÙl al-MukhtÁrah, MufÐd calls ÝAlÐ the Prophet's nÁÞib in speaking about ÝAlÐ's great faith and virtues, but not to refer to him as a nÁÞib in a technical sense.
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The term sulÔÁn is used frequently in the MuqniÝah. It is usually used in a general, non-technical meaning to refer to the person who governs the community with comprehensive power or sovereignty, or the sovereign himself. In some places, it refers to the ShiÝi Imams. In others, it is used to speak of the head of the community acting as the judge.
16 It also appears in compound forms such as 'just sulÔÁn' or 'right sulÔÁn', 17 23 Prior to the Umayyads, amir was equivalent to ÝÁmil, 'functionary', including tax-collectors. 24 Levy suggests that in the lifetime of the Prophet, the ÝÁmil (whose responsibility it was to collect alms-taxes) was separate from that of the amir; however, they were sent together to newly occupied territories. 25 'Amir' also, of course, meant a military commander. Under the caliphate, the title 'was bestowed on an ÝÁmil (delegate) appointed with the approval of the caliph'. 26 In ÝAbbÁsid times, political connotations were added to the military notion, so that 'amir' came to mean both a high ranking civil and military official. 'Amir' thus became the habitual title of a governor, ruler, or provincial military official holding political and military power together.
The term ÎÁkim in MufÐd's usage refers to an appointee of an Imams. Generally, it means 'sovereign', 'judge', or 'governor'; 27 The term sulÔÁn is used in a general, non-technical sense also in MufÐd's KitÁb al-IrshÁd, where it refers to the holder of the highest level of power in a state, or the power itself. 29 In the IrshÁd, we see the phrases sulÔÁn al-ÒaÝb, 30 'unjust ruler', and sulÔÁn al-risÁlah, 31 meaning the Prophet. There is one instance in the IrshÁd where sulÔÁn denotes the Imam in its ImamÐ sense, 32 but on other occasions, MufÐd uses the expressions sulÔÁn al-zamÁn (sulÔÁn of the time) in a general sense -for instance in reference to an ÝAbbÁsid caliph who might be identified either as al-MuhtadÐ or al-MuÝtamid. 33 Does MufÐd use the term sulÔÁn for the jurist? He defines the Imams as sulÔÁn al-Islam and then states that the amirs and ÎÁkims appointed by the Imams have the same authority for execution of the QurÞanic punishments. It is the ShiÝi jurists who judge on behalf of the Imams for these punishments. 34 So it does not mean that the jurist is a sovereign also holding political and military power.
The term nÁÛir (literally, 'supervisor') or nÁÛir fi umÙr al-muslimÐn
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('supervisor of the Muslims' affairs') refers to the sovereign person or judge; nÁÛir in its general, non-technical meaning can be both judicial and political. However, in the section on QurÞanic punishments of MufÐd's MuqniÝah, it takes on the specific meaning of judgment in relation to the jurists 36 and has a political meaning only for amirs. 37 Shaykh ÓÙsÐ in his NihÁyah also terms the Imam nÁÛir fi umÙr al-muslimÐn. He explains that when the Imam is not present, the just and knowledgeable ImamÐ jurists play his role in the case of someone dying without an executor for his will by appointing the executor for him. 38 This is clearly a judicial function, and a rather narrow one at that. Kamali asserts that the mujtahid is competent in both judicial affairs and supervising 'the affairs of the Muslims'. In reference to MufÐd, Sayyid MurtaÃÁ, ÓÙsÐ, and the leading mujtahid Shaykh AnÒÁrÐ (d. 1281/1864), Kamali says that '[…] a fully qualified mujtahid (one qualified to exercise independent reasoning) is a representative (nÁÞib) of the Imam regarding judgement and administration of the people affairs'. 39 Kamali's statement, I would assert, applies to the later moments of niyÁbah, and not to the period subject to discussion here. There is no clear evidence in MufÐd's writings that he regarded the jurists as possessing both the power to judge in the community and to administer the affairs of its members. There is no doubt that he considered the first valid; but for the second, which is crucial to the issue of politics, much clearer evidence is required.
The Imam's amirs, hÁkims, and wÁlÐs
ShiÝi legal literature in MufÐd's time does not present specifically ShiÝi definitions of the terms ÎÁkim, wÁlÐ, or amir. They are used in a manner very close to that seen in Sunni literature. This is probably why Sourdel translates wulÁt as 'agents' rather than giving it a political sense. 40 In the Sunni political hierarchy in the early centuries of Islam, authority was transferred from the Prophet to the caliphs, with the sultan gaining power afterwards. Amirs included a variety of figures with lesser powers than the caliphs, from princes in the caliphal family to provincial governors and military commanders. Bernard Lewis places 'sultan' beneath 'amir', dating its official appearance to the year 428/1037 under the Great Seljuqs.
41 I would assert, however, that before the Seljuqs, the Ghaznavids, who were contemporary to MufÐd, called themselves 'sultans' and held the titles 'amir' and 'sultan' simultaneously.
Despite the parallel vocabulary, the ShiÝi reality was very different from that of the Sunnis. In MufÐd's time, the model of political hierarchy seen among the Sunnis did not exist. MufÐd nevertheless uses the terms sultan, amir, ÎÁkim, nÁÛir, and wulÁt. Unlike in the Sunni construction, he defines the Imams as 'sultans of Islam' -that is to say, the main authority, equal to the caliph for the Sunnis. The Imam's source of authority is God, because he is appointed by Him. MufÐd says, 'The Imams of Guidance are sultans of Islam, appointed by God, and the amirs and ÎÁkims they appoint are responsible for enforcing punishments (ÎudÙd).' 42 Let us look first at the theoretical side of MufÐd's construction. Instead of the caliph, the Imam is the successor to the Prophet, and thus the head of the community. The amirs and ÎÁkims are the Imam's appointees, possessing, theoretically, the same authority as the Imam. It is necessary, however, to understand that they are entirely different figures from a theological point of view. MufÐd considers the possibility that the Imam's agents have the same characteristics as the Imam, but he decides in every case that this is not so. It is not necessary for appointees to be infallible or specifically designated (naÒÒ). They must be more knowledgeable than others, but their knowledge does not have to be equal to that of the Imam.
MufÐd's construction of a political system, it should be understood, was mostly imaginary. Although he speaks about amirs appointed by the Imam, none actually existed. Though the terms 'amir', 'ÎÁkim', and 'wÁlÐ' have political, military, and administrative meanings, they were not relevant even during the time of the ShiÝi Imams, who made no such appointments, save for the first Imam ÝAlÐ. The purely judicial title of 'ÎÁkim', however, did have a reality.
The jurists and judgeship
In MufÐd's theology, all power belongs to God, the Prophet, and the Imams, one after the other. Though the Imam has disappeared, he still is the holder of supreme power. The Imam does, however, delegate judicial power. Although MufÐd does not use the term niyÁbah in his MuqniÝah, the general concept of deputyship is present when he discusses the question of the jurists taking charge of judicial affairs involving QurÞanic punishments (iqÁmat al-ÎudÙd). 43 Why are judicial affairs the subject of delegation? Traditions according to which the jurists were granted authority to judge belong to a time when the Imams were not only distant from political leadership, but also extremely reluctant to mount any political claims. In a situation in which there was a lack of actual power, delegation of most powers was irreal. What was left was legal rulings and judgeship. Emphasis on these was pivotal for the ShiÝi community, for it kept the unofficial ShiÝi judiciary system alive and helped to preserve the identity of a politically marginalized community. The QurÞanic punishments in particular are mentioned because, as I have already suggested, their operation stood as a symbol of the continued existence of ShiÝi law. Unlike private law, they also suggested real power, which the jurists and their system of law were, in reality, deprived of. MufÐd's detailed discussion of the ÎudÙd should be understood in light of these realities.
MufÐd's view is that the Imam has granted the ShiÝi jurists authority to apply the QurÞanic punishments, if possible. The QurÞanic punishments include the amputation of the hand for thieves, lashing for adulterers, and retaliation for murderers. The responsibility is, in technical terms, farÃ ÝalÁ al-kifÁyah -a duty that, even if it does not have to be carried out by all members of the community, must be carried out by someone; as well as farÃ ÝalÁ al-ÔÁÝah, a duty that can be carried out by a few, for instance some or one of the jurists, but only if it does not involve danger to one's life, property, or religion. Thus administration of the punishments ceases to be obligatory for the jurists if they fear the unjust ruler or threats from other groups. 44 MufÐd calls on the ShiÝi jurists to apply the QurÞanic punishments at least among their family members and servants, and then expand them to their relatives and other community groups, as far as conditions, especially safety, allow.
Obviously, the scope for judicial activity among ShiÝis was quite limited. MufÐd also, however, allows the jurists to act as judges while serving as functionaries appointed by an 'unjust' ruler. MufÐd writes:
If a ShiÝi jurist is appointed by a non-ShiÝi ruler to administer the QurÞanic punishments (ÎudÙd) among a group of the ruler's subjects, the jurist will be personally obliged ( farÃ mutaÝayyan) to accept it, because of the outwardly apparent (ÛÁhir) power of the ruler. Then the jurist shall execute the prescribed punishments, enforce the ordinances, command the good and forbid the evil, and fight non-Muslims (referring to jihad) and iniquitous persons. In this case, it is obligatory for his ShiÝi brothers to support him whenever he requests help; of course, as long as he (the jurist) does not exceed the limits of faith and does not obey the 'sultan of darkness/misguidance' when he acts against God's orders. 45 This statement conveys important information. We see that working for an unjust ruler if asked and even obedience to such a ruler is obligatory, at least as far as accepting a judgeship goes. In addition, MufÐd makes it obligatory for other ShiÝis to support such jurists whenever they need aid and as long as they follow the 'truth' (Îaqq, i.e. ShiÝi law). If the jurists do not fulfil these conditions, support is forbidden. 46 MufÐd is quite concerned about how to justify working for an unjust ruler, in light of the apparent prohibition in ShiÝi thought. According to MufÐd, if a ShiÝi jurist working in a non-ShiÝi judicial system judges on the basis of ShiÝi law, his cooperation with the unjust system is allowed or even necessary. He stresses that neither the ShiÝi jurists nor those who are appointed by the oppressive sultan are allowed to judge against the permanent principles of ShiÝism, save in a time of great pressure when it might be necessary to practice dissimilation (taqiyyah) for fear of losing faith or life. Even at such a time, however, deliberate shedding of ShiÝi blood is not in any way permissible. 47 Clearly, serving ShiÝi interests is the reason for permissibility of working with an unjust ruler.
Thus, to review, the doctrine of niyÁbah for MufÐd is limited to judgeship. He explicitly says that the Imams granted ShiÝi jurists the authority to judge. The scholars must carry out all responsibilities given to judges in ShiÝi law. MufÐd says much the same in his AmÁlÐ: 'Whenever God wishes good for His servants, He has righteous individuals govern them, jurists judge among them, and places property in the hands of the generous.' 48 Although MufÐd permits the ShiÝi jurist to play a role as a political authority if he is appointed to such a position by an unjust ruler, he only talks about this in connection with authority over Sunnis. 49 Possibly, this rather odd omission of ShiÝis might be due to taqiyyah, i.e. strategic dissimulation. MufÐd is silent on the jurist's political authority over ShiÝis because he does not want to put himself or the community in a dangerous position with the ÝAbbÁsids by suggesting that the jurist could have independent political power. Even, however, if we admit that MufÐd permits the jurists to possess political leadership -for which we really do not have solid evidence -he never represents it as a monopolistic and obligatory 'guardianship' (wilÁyah) of the jurists. So once again, we must conclude that deputyship for MufÐd is limited to judgeship, and that its actual functioning during his time was rather narrow.
The jurists and leadership of the Friday prayer
Leadership of the Friday prayer has been much debated by ShiÝi scholars. There has been a connection in Islam overall between leadership of the Friday prayer and political power, as the Prophet, the rightly-guided caliphs, and Umayyad and the ÝAbbÁsid caliphs led the prayer. In ShiÝism, leading the congregational Friday prayer has been the exclusive task and right of the Imam, the spiritual and political leader. What then is the situation in the absence of the Imam?
MufÐd was born seven or nine years after the beginning of the greater occultation in 329/941, so his views throw light on how the Friday prayer was treated among the early ShiÝi community. Let us first, however, see what the historical sources can tell us. History records observance of the congregational Friday prayer before and after MufÐd's time. According to al-KhaÔÐb al-BaghdÁdÐ (463/1071), the ShiÝis of Baghdad had a mosque for Friday prayer in BurÁthÁ; the mosque was destroyed by the ÝAbbÁsid caliph al-Muqtadir when it was reported to him that the congregants were cursing the Prophet's companions and disobeying the ruling caliph. In 324/936, Amir Bajkam MÁkÁnÐ, Commander of the Commanders in Baghdad, ordered the mosque rebuilt, and the caliph al-RÁÃÐ's name was inscribed upon it. 50 The mosque was rebuilt by 329/940 and Friday prayer was held there until 450/1058. 51 Ibn AthÐr (630/1233) reveals that the congregational Friday prayer continued in BurÁthÁ during the ShiÝi-Sunni clashes occurring in Baghdad in 349/960 even while it was halted in other mosques in areas in which ShiÝis were a majority. 52 In short, the prayer did take place, despite the dominant theoretical view dictating that leading the Friday prayer is the exclusive right of the Imam. Who, we may ask, led the prayers, and what was the position of ShiÝi scholars? It was very probably the ShiÝi ulema themselves who led the prayer, due to lack of any ShiÝi political leader, though we do not have firm information on this, or any indication whether MufÐd participated.
MufÐd begins his discussion of the Friday prayer in his MuqniÝah by saying that it is obligatory (wÁjib) and should be held in congregation. 53 The obligation, however, depends on the presence of the Imam. MufÐd does not say clearly if that means the infallible Imam such that the prayer becomes obligatory only during his presence, or any imam, that is to say, a generic prayer leader. When MufÐd talks about the physical and moral qualities of an imam leading the Friday prayer, saying that such a person must be pious, a non-slave, of legitimate birth, an adult, and so on, 54 it does seem evident that he is referring to a fallible (ordinary or generic) imam. Nor does he list among the attributes of the Imam the quality of being a jurist or faqÐh, as he says in the case of judgeship. This leads one to conclude that the Friday congregational prayer in MufÐd's view does not depend on the infallible Imam leading it. Some ShiÝi scholars after MufÐd say that the prayer during the occultation is not licit, while others say that it is permissible but not obligatory. It appears that MufÐd, as opposed to some of his successors, considered the Friday prayer obligatory during the occultation, with the only condition being the presence of a qualified imam (of any kind) and at least four other persons to form the congregation. Otherwise, it would become merely permissible. Thus, it seems, prayer leadership is not one of a jurist's deputized duties.
MufÐd's students SallÁr al-DaylamÐ (448/1056) 55 and al-MurtaÃÁ 56 say that the Friday prayer is obligatory only when the Imam or his (specific) appointee is present, and not during the occultation as MufÐd says. It seems that it may even be prohibited during the occultation in their view. In his al-NihÁyah, ÓÙsÐ (460/1068) expresses the same opinion about prayer before the occultation, but he also says that all kinds of prayerthus presumably including Friday prayer -are permitted and may be led by the jurist during the occultation. 57 MufÐd, in contrast, limits the role of the scholars and jurists in prayer to daily prayers, the ÝEid prayers, prayers during the eclipses of the sun and moon, and the prayer for rain.
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The argument of Bayhom-Daou 59 and some other modern scholars that MufÐd held that the ShiÝi jurists could serve as leaders of Friday prayer because they were granted that authority by the Imam is not clearly understandable. This can also be seen by referring to MufÐd's students DaylamÐ and al-MurtaÃÁ. MufÐd maintains that the Imams delegated their judicial authority to the jurists, and nothing more. He does not, unfortunately, say why he excludes Friday prayer from the list of different prayers given above.
Deputyship and jihad
ShiÝis did not participate actively in jihad, perhaps due to their political marginalization. This may be why MufÐd does not pay much attention to jihad, even though the concept of jihad weighed heavily on the minds of early and mediaeval Muslims. In the MuqniÝah, jihad is mentioned only eleven times as a noun and three times as a verb. 60 MufÐd does not allocate an independent section of the MuqniÝah to jihad, as became the practice after him. He instead puts it in a section on commanding good and forbidding evil and QurÞanic punishments. Even here, one can find the word 'jihad' only three times: once in the title of the book, and twice in the body of the text. 61 In his al-FuÒÙl al-ÝAsharah, in answer to objections raised by opponents of the ShiÝis about the disappearance of the Imam, MufÐd does say that religious duties and principles, including jihad, do not cease during the Imam's absence but are fulfilled by his wulÁt, ÝÁmils, and amirs. 62 He does not, however, provide substantial information about who these figures might be and how they could carry out jihad from within a non-ShiÝi system.
MufÐd does not discuss jihad because it was declared by the political authority, while the ShiÝi Imam was not present and had not designated a political deputy. Nevertheless, jihad in the sense of war against kuffÁr does occur once in the MuqniÝah. This concerns the jurist engaging in jihad when he works for an unjust sultan, 63 which was a reality in the time of MufÐd since the ÝAbbÁsids were still fighting against non-Muslims. On one occasion, the word jihad is also used to describe fighting against non-ShiÝi Muslims, whom MufÐd calls 'misguided and wrongly acting' (ahl al-ÃalÁl wa al-khilÁf ). He calls this type of jihad 'grand' (aÝÛam) jihad. Jihad in this case means the jurist using his position under the unjust ruler to harm non-ShiÝis. 64 The key point, in any case, is that jihad is not among the responsibilities granted the ShiÝi jurist, in MufÐd's view.
Commanding good and forbidding evil
MufÐd affirms that commanding good and forbidding evil are compulsory. They take two forms. The first is commanding good and forbidding evil by word or tongue. This is a collective duty. Wrongdoers violating the shariÝah need to be admonished by some individuals, not by all members of the community. Using force against those who violate the law, the second level, is part of the duty of the sultan. Commanding good and forbidding evil become individually incumbent upon whoever has been appointed or permitted by the sultan to perform that task. 65 Note that it is not clear what MufÐd means by the sultan 66 here, whether the Imam or any dominant power. What is clear is that it is not the responsibility of the jurist. This is the material found in MufÐd's AwÁÞil. In his MuqniÝah, he lists three levels of commanding good and forbidding evil: by heart, tongue, and finally the hand, i.e., force. As in the AwÁÞil, he stresses that carrying out this duty is obligatory for all ShiÝis -whom he calls ahl al-imÁn or 'people of true belief ' -if they are able to do so. Those with little or no power are responsible for commanding good and forbidding evil through words and force, but without wounding or killing. If, however, such persons may suffer harm as a result, they should command and forbid only with their hearts, by showing displeasure. The third level, use of force involving killing or wounding, is exclusive to the sultan. 67 Once again, it is not clear what MufÐd means by the term 'sultan' -whether the Imam or any dominant power. And again we see that the one responsible for commanding good and forbidding evil through force is not the jurist -except, of course, like others in his capacity as an ordinary Muslim, where there is no fear of harm. Even if one assumes that by sultan of the time MufÐd means the ShiÝi Imam, we cannot consequently infer that this becomes the jurist during the occultation.
Deputyship and religious taxes
Religious taxes, especially the khums or one-fifth tax, have a significant place in ShiÝism. During the occultation, it fell to the scholars not only to interpret the texts concerning religious taxes, but also, for the most part, to practically manage them. 68 One cannot, however, infer that it was intended that the jurists be heads of state simply because they received these taxes. MufÐd affirms that the alms-tax (zakÁt) must be given over to the jurists, but not because of political leadership. He says that the alms first go to the Prophet; then to his successor, the Imam; and then in the absence of the Imam to his appointed delegates (sufarÁÞ, i.e. the Imam's representatives during the minor occultation); and finally to trustworthy ShiÝi jurists when there is no such delegate. Certainly MufÐd views the jurists as a distinct group placed over others in the ShiÝi community; but this special position comes not from deputyship, but knowledge, as he says that the tax should be given to the jurists since they 'know better than others where to spend zakÁt'.
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Based on statements from MufÐd and later scholars, Bayhom-Daou concludes that early ShiÝi jurists regarded themselves as the representatives of tax donors, rather than of the Imam. 70 I have already established that the jurists were not the Imam's delegates in the management of khums; I must add that the notion that they were deputized by donors of zakÁt is also not supported by available evidence. I repeat: MufÐd makes payment of zakÁt to the jurists mandatory not on the basis of any delegated power, whether from the Imam or those paying tax, but for the simple reason that they know best how to spend it. They do not have a formal position or function, but merely, in effect, provide a service.
MufÐd defines khums as an obligatory (wÁjib) tax, levied on all types of properties and income accruing to ShiÝis, whether through ordinary economic efforts or military action. 71 The way the khums was to be collected and distributed deserves our attention, since this speaks to the jurists' authority and helps us to know if such functions were part of a deputyship. MufÐd mentions several approaches to administration of khums in the absence of the Imam. These are: discontinuing it, since the Imam is not present; distributing it among descendants of the Prophet and also poor ShiÝis in general; burying it so that it can be given to the Imam when he returns; 72 keeping it aside to be delivered to the Imam upon his return; and finally, as in the present dominant legal view, dividing it into two shares, one of which is to go to the Imam and the other to the needy among the Prophet's offspring. 73 Ibn IdrÐs al-ÍillÐ (d. 598/1202) cites a ruling of MufÐd that shows that he favoured the last approach. According to Ibn IdrÐs, MufÐd replied to a community member asking about whom he should deliver his khums to that it should be divided into two portions, half for the needy among MuÎammad 's descendants (specifically, orphans, the poor, and needy travellers), and half for the Imam. The donor according to MufÐd is responsible for delivering the first portion and also for giving the Imam's share to the Imam himself, if he is able to reach him. If the Imam is not to be found, the donor should ask a trustworthy person to deliver the tax to the Imam on his behalf. 74 Thus according to both MufÐd's MuqniÝah and Ibn IdrÐs's KitÁb al-SarÁÞir, ShiÝi authorities do not play a role in managing the khums. Payment and delivery of the tax is the duty of the donor.
In MufÐd's account, nevertheless, a ShiÝi working for a non-ShiÝi governmental system may collect khums. He considers this function one of the conditions of working for a non-ShiÝi ruler, as he says:
One who is appointed by iniquitous ( fÁsiq) persons (i.e., rulers) for administering societies and territories must help and protect the ShiÝis and pay khums on all properties and booty he gains through his governorship. Otherwise, his working for that non-ShiÝi ruler is not permissible.
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This case is discussed in detail below. Let us think here about who the 'one appointed' might be. There are two possibilities: the appointee is either a jurist, or an amir, a commander. Appointing a jurist for nonjudicial positions was not current practice in the period we are talking about, so that is unlikely, leading us to conclude that the appointee being discussed is in reality an amir. In what capacity did this personality pay his taxes? Here again there are two possibilities. One may say that the donor is the person in authority himself, that is, he is to pay khums from his own income earned from working as the agent of the state. 76 It is more logical, however, to imagine the donor of khums not as real person but rather a legal one. What is meant is that that, as in early Islam, the person in authority is obliged to collect khums from his subjects (whether ShiÝi or Sunni) and send it to the seat of the caliphate. Otherwise, the statement is redundant, since all ShiÝis in their personal capacity have to pay their khums. Thus we may conclude that gathering and distributing khums here is the responsibility not of someone functioning as a jurist, but a political authority. The personality concerned may indeed be a jurist, but his work for the ruler is nevertheless in the capacity of an amir.
It is good to recall here that MufÐd also does not say that zakÁt, the other religious tax in addition to khums, is to be managed by the jurists as part of their deputyship. He states that zakÁt must be paid to the trustworthy jurists (al-fuqahÁÞ al-maÞmÙnÙn), but only says, as I mentioned, that this is to be done because the jurists know better how to spend it.
MufÐd also briefly discusses the land tax (kharÁj). The whole discussion is related to the period of the Imams' presence during which they are the religio-political leaders of the community. 
Deputyship from an unjust ruler is deputyship from the Imam
The relationship of jurists with a non-ShiÝi political system deemed 'unjust' has long been debated in ShiÝism. The root idea behind the problem is that sovereignty always belongs to God, the Prophet, and the Imams. Thus ShiÝis tried, both in theory and practice, to distance themselves from non-ShiÝi rulers and political systems. Reality, however, necessitated relations of some kind, giving rise to the intellectual problem of legitimating cooperation with an illegitimate state. ShiÝi treatment of the problem differed widely, ranging from prohibition on any type of collaboration with an unjust state (including a ShiÝi one), to permission for some degree of contact, to making it obligatory. MufÐd has his own view. He not only permits working for and being delegated by a non-ShiÝi government, but also in some circumstances deems cooperation necessary. He brings up the issue both in relation to law and politics (imÁrah). His judicial views are discussed above in connection with judgeship. His approach to politics is as follows:
And the ImamÐ who commands the people and has been appointed outwardly (ÛÁhir) by an unjust ruler to work for him is in reality (ÎaqÐqah) the amir on behalf of the Imam, and not on behalf of the ruler of 'the people of darkness or misguidance', because he has been permitted by the Imam. 78 MufÐd touches briefly on forms of cooperation with 'unjust' political systems in his theological work AwÁÞil. For MufÐd, lending aid to the unjust system in the right instance is permissible and sometimes obligatory; although it is not permitted if one willingly or deliberately assists in oppression and aggression. 79 Such cooperation, however, is allowed only with the permission of the 'Imam of the time', and under certain conditions such as helping the ShiÝi community, judging according to ShiÝi law, and so on. 80 Now, since cooperation with an unjust ruler is legitimated by the Imam, the authority of a ShiÝi scholar or jurist working for a ruler is as authentic as the authority of those who are appointed by the Imam to work in the ShiÝi community. Both, in effect, are appointed by the Imam. It is, however, necessary to keep in mind that the jurists working in the community function only as judges or persons performing religious rituals. They are not given political duties and do not lead the community in non-religious affairs.
As mentioned above, textual and historical evidence tells us that MufÐd also envisioned non-jurists holding office. As for textual evidence, MufÐd uses the phrase tadbÐr al-ÝibÁd wa al-bilÁd (administration of people and territories), 81 a clear reference to administrative and political positions. The holders of such positions were not ShiÝi scholars. That is to say, they were not ShiÝi scholars if the reference to 'administration of peoples and territories' refers to those functions over the ShiÝi community. If what is referred to is administration over all the Muslims as a functionary of a Sunni ruler, the office-holder could be a jurist. The matter is complicated by the equivocality of words and terms in MufÐd's time, when specialized technical vocabulary was not much developed in ShiÝi or, for that matter, Sunni legal literature. We do, in any case, have historical evidence: we know that in MufÐd's time, two groups of ShiÝis worked for the ÝAbbÁsid caliphs, those being the jurists and the amirs.
Having established that the office holders MufÐd talks about include jurists and non-jurists, we must ask how in his view the Imam would give permission for the latter. It will be useful here to examine al-MurtaÃÁ's approach toward the same issue. As we have seen, al-SharÐf al-MurtaÃÁ was the leading figure in the ShiÝi community in his time and an outstanding pupil of MufÐd who worked, like his father and elder brother before him, for the ÝAbbÁsid caliph as judge and naqÐb (head of the descendants of the Prophet). Kazemi demonstrates that two other ShiÝi jurists, AbÙ al-FatÎ al-KarÁjakÐ and Ibn al-BarrÁj (al-MurtaÃÁ's students) also worked as judges for Sunni governments, so this was not an unusual situation. 82 al-MurtaÃÁ, in fact, wrote a treatise on the subject, entitled MasÞalat fi al-ÝAmal maÝa al-SulÔÁn (On Working for the Government), 83 two years after his teacher's death.
It is evident from comparing the views of MufÐd and al-MurtaÃÁ that their basic idea is similar: working for an illegitimate rulership is permissible and even obligatory, with the permission of the Imam. Al-MurtaÃÁ, however, argues the issue more fully. He categorizes the ruler (and consequently, rulership) into two kinds: legitimate and just (muÎiqq ÝÁdil) or illegitimate, unjust, and usurpatory (mubÔil, ÛÁlim, mutaghallib). 84 For al-MurtaÃÁ, working for a just ruler is permissible and even obligatory (wÁjib) in some cases, such as when it would be in the interests of the ShiÝi community, and is thus beyond question. Working for an illegitimate or unjust ruler, however, may be obligatory, permissible, an object of caution (mahdhÙr), evil (qabÐÎ), or forbidden. Holding office on behalf of a ruler who is a usurper is obligatory when the office holder either knows or strongly supposes (Ûann) that he will be capable of upholding the right (iqÁmat al-Îaqq), rejecting falsehood, ordering good and forbidding evil. It is permissible when the jurist fears for his personal wealth if he rejects the position. It is an object of caution if one is forced to accept the office and believes he will be killed if he does not accept. It will, on the other hand, be evil to accept the office if holding it is a cause of evil or the office-holder uses his office for his own worldly interests. Accepting the appointment is, exactly as MufÐd says, forbidden if it involves assisting an unjust ruler to disobey God. 85 As a rationalist, al-MurtaÃÁ cites both rational and legal (sharÝÐ and ÝaqlÐ) proofs for his position. 86 For instance, he cites ÝAlÐ's caliphate as an example of being accepted by an unjust group (i.e. the various factions and persons who were in his favour following the murder of ÝUthmÁn), adding that there are other many cases in which scholars and pious men have accepted positions under an illegitimate ruler. The rational justification, which appears to be more important for al-MurtaÃÁ's argument than the legal proof, concerns the interests ShiÝis derive from having one of their own in office.
Thus we see that in the view of MufÐd as well as his students, jurists can work for so-called 'unjust' rulers, since they have been given permission to do so by the Imam. The jurist holding such position does not, however, work for the unjust ruler in his capacity as a ShiÝi jurist, but only as a functionary (whether as an amir, or as a judge among Sunnis alone, since it is forbidden for ShiÝis to refer to an unjust power for judgement so that ShiÝis seeking judgement could refer to that jurist only privately). He does not have political power in his capacity as a ShiÝi jurist, even if he is encouraged to use his position to the advantage of the community. We must conclude that MufÐd's theory of deputyship is apolitical despite the permission to work for unjust rulers, since the jurists are not political figures in their own right.
Analysis and conclusion
In MufÐd's perspective of the doctrine of deputyship or juristic authority, the doctrine is clearly apolitical. MufÐd leaves no doubt that ShiÝi jurists are delegated by the Imam to judge and to execute the QurÞanic punishments, but deputyship does not extend beyond that. This very limited construction reflects the political circumstances of the ShiÝi community in MufÐd's time. The ShiÝis were living as a minority under the Sunni ÝAbbÁsids, even though the Buwayhids and Twelver ShiÝi HamdÁnids had gained power as well. In addition to political limitations, deputyship was subject to theoretical limitations resulting from a conviction that any worldly power other than that of the Imams was illegitimate and that the Hidden Imam would return soon in any case. Due to these limitations, the jurists, though they were supposedly delegates of the Imam, were reluctant to play a political role even in religious duties.
Even though MufÐd says that the Friday congregational prayer is obligatory, he does not include it among the various prayers led by the ShiÝi jurists. He does not say why this is so, but one can infer that a specific ground or qualification of the jurist for holding the Friday prayer is absent, though present for the other prayers. If we look at the history of the Friday prayer, it is clear that the leader of this prayer has had a relationship with political power. 87 The Prophet MuÎammad instituted Friday prayers in Medina when he first gained political power, and holders or representatives of power among the first four caliphs, the Umayyads, and the ÝAbbÁsids also used to lead the prayer. The Imams were both the religious and political leaders of the ShiÝis, even if they could not, with the exception of ÝAlÐ, actually exercise political power. Thus it is possible that MufÐd does not consider that leadership of the Friday prayer falls to the ShiÝi jurists because, for him, they are not politically the delegates of the Imam. 88 As for the khums, MufÐd, as explained above, believes that leading ShiÝis (whether jurists or not) who work for unjust rulers are to collect the khums tax. Let us now ask why that right or obligation falls to those persons and who distributes the funds. For MufÐd, the khums is divided into two parts: one belonging to the Imam, and the other reserved for needy descendants of the Prophet. Taxpayers are allowed to distribute the funds in person to the needy, but MufÐd does not tell us how the Imam's share is to be delivered. It seems that in his view, no one has the right to spend the share of the political and religious leader of the community, the Imam. Nevertheless, MufÐd makes it clear that a ShiÝi figure functioning in the non-ShiÝi system must collect and pay the khums. Such a person has no more privileges than his counterpart within the ShiÝi community, except for his connection to the dominant political power. Even in the case of the jurist with connections to political power, MufÐd does not give any information about the agent who manages the tax; he does not make it clear if he collects khums for himself to manage it, for another jurist, or even for the state. He also does not explain if the agent is to spend the Imam's share, bury it, or hand it over to a trustworthy person to give it to the Imam whenever he appears. As in the case of the Friday prayer, it is probable that MufÐd refrains from addressing these details because of the connection between tax collection and political power. If tax collection were part of the jurists' duties, MufÐd would have addressed the topic of jurists not possessing political power gathering the khums from their brethren. It is therefore actually not important if the ShiÝi figure holding office on behalf of the illegitimate ruler is a jurist, amir, or some other figure. The significant point is that the collection and administration of khums is not part of delegation (deputyship) at this time. Delegation is limited to judgeship, while khums is not a juristic function.
Jihad presents a parallel case. MufÐd includes jihad among the tasks of a ShiÝi jurist functioning within a non-ShiÝi judicial system, but he does not mention it when discussing the tasks of judges not possessing political power and working within the ShiÝi community. Commanding good and forbidding evil is another parallel case. The ShiÝi jurists do not have the power to command good and forbid evil with force because they do not have any political power. Their responsibility in commanding good and forbidding evil is just the same as that of other Muslims. From the point of view of religious expertise they would have been the most appropriate persons to engage in that duty; but, first, they did not possess power, which is 'a requirement in the fulfilment of this crucial obligation in the public interest', 89 and second, the obligation itself is not incumbent on every individual.
MufÐd discussed the cooperation of ShiÝi scholars with unjust rulers in response to practical and theoretical limitations faced by ShiÝism. He looks for ways right might co-exist with wrong. To treat this problem, he takes both a macro-and micro-analytical view. On the macro level, seen in his theological works, he looks at the Sunni system overall and condemns it not only as unjust and false, but non-salvific. 90 In the AwÁÞil, for instance, he divides the Abodes (dÁr) into three: dÁr al-Îarb (Abode of War), dÁr al-IslÁm (Abode of Islam), and dÁr al-ÐmÁn (Abode of True Belief). 91 As Lambton writes, dÁr al-ÐmÁn 'comprised those places in which the true faith, i.e. IthnÁ ÝAsharÐ ShiÝism, prevailed, whereas the dÁr al-islÁm consisted of those places where Islam other than IthnÁ 'AsharÐ ShiÝism was followed.' 92 In his juridical work, on the other hand, MufÐd works at the micro level where right can potentially co-exist with wrong. From a micro perspective, the non-ShiÝi political system, while not pure overall, represents a combination of aggression and justice, giving ShiÝi scholars the opportunity to choose just aspects and leave the wrong aside in assisting their community.
How is justice to be distinguished from injustice? As I have explained, it is necessary to distinguish between two types of agents undertaking responsibilities in the so-called unjust system, the jurists ( fuqahÁÞ) and amirs (umarÁÞ). MufÐd, it seems, left it to the jurists themselves to distinguish justice from injustice. The criteria for doing so are related to ShiÝism, since ShiÝism itself is considered to be 'right' (Îaqq). The most important criteria are the ability to judge in accordance with ShiÝi law, to look out for the interests of the community, and to prevent the shedding of ShiÝi blood. 93 A jurist acting in the capacity of an amir applies the same criteria. MufÐd is silent, however, about the case of an amir who is not also a jurist. Why did MufÐd take the trouble to formulate such elaborate justifications for working for an unjust ruler? The answer is found in the nature of delegation as perceived in that period. Delegation in MufÐd's view is limited to the law, without venturing into politics or military affairs. This very limited notion left the ShiÝis struggling with their political defeat. Living without any political power whatsoever was difficult and harmful. The only way out of this dilemma was to find a way to politically reconcile with the dominant system, which was done by MufÐd under the rubric of 'working for the sultan'. This solution as detailed by MufÐd secured the ShiÝis' interests from one side, and avoided contradicting ShiÝi theology and the ShiÝi worldview on the other. MufÐd's theory of 'working for the sultan' does not represent accommodation, as some have asserted, but the opposite: the least compromise with politics possible, carefully fenced in by theory.
As we have seen, a ShiÝi holder of office on behalf of an illegitimate ruler could be either a jurist or amir. Though there were no ShiÝi amirs after the ÝAbbÁsid dynasty was extinguished, the ShiÝi Buyids and HamdÁnids were contemporary with MufÐd. One would think that MufÐd would be interested in the sovereignty of such amirs since for him, the jurist holding office on behalf of an unjust ruler is a step toward enforcing the ordinances of ShiÝi law. He asks the community to follow and support the office holder in order to enhance his legitimacy. Al-MurtaÃÁ is very clearly interested in power. He says that without power, the obligatory enforcement of shariÝah -for instance, enjoining good and forbidding evil -is not possible. Power, according to al-MurtaÃÁ, is consequently obligatory (wÁjib) because it is the means or is the premise of enforcement of shariÝah. 94 Nonetheless, neither MufÐd nor al-MurtaÃÁ talks of building a ShiÝi sovereign power led by ShiÝis, whether jurists or amirs. They did not regard the Buyids or HamdÁnids as constituting such a power, since their legitimacy was derived from the ÝAbbÁsid caliphs. The term 'just sultan', with whom cooperation is permissible or obligatory according to MufÐd and al-MurtaÃÁ, 95 means the Imam and no one else; it refers neither to the jurists nor the ShiÝi amirs, because although amirs working for the ÝAbbÁsids theoretically had the Imam's permission, they were not heads of state, so technically they were not called 'sultans' in MufÐd's definition of the term. And the jurists were not 'just sultans' because the authority granted to them was limited to judgeship, so they could not be heads of state.
Thus it appears that the idea of working for an unjust ruler formulated by MufÐd and further developed by his student al-MurtaÃÁ is a response to severe limitations on delegation or deputyship in its early phase. The goal was to prevent the ordinances of the shariÝah (in the ShiÝi version, of course) from being suspended. Because of the importance of this goal, the case of the unjust ruler continued to be discussed after MufÐd and was followed in practice by many others. The idea of working for an unjust ruler has had a profound and lasting influence on ShiÝi thought, for it raised this question in the minds of the jurists: if working with a Sunni sultan can be in the interests of ShiÝism and permitted by the Imam, might perhaps cooperating with a ShiÝi sultan or even establishing a jurist-run state be the best choice?
In conclusion, Twelver ShiÝis between the fourth and fifth/eleventh and twelfth centuries constituted a mostly apolitical community living under ÝAbbÁsid rule. Some ShiÝi amirs gained political and military power, but they were formally in the service of the ÝAbbÁsids. The Twelver ShiÝi religious authorities remained out of the political structure, occupying themselves instead with teaching and writing. It should be remembered, however, that the Imamate itself was not apolitical. This is why MufÐd uses the term sulÔÁn al-IslÁm to describe the Imam. He is indeed the sultan, the sovereign power, with his sovereignty coming from none other than God.
The ShiÝi jurists are not the sultan of Islam, though appointed by the Imam, for their authority is not equal to that of the Imam. The Imam excludes the jurists from being on the same level of authority with him, as they are granted only the authority to judge on his behalf as the sovereign. In other words, delegation in MufÐd's formulation is apolitical. Despite the (theoretical) political authority of the Imam, it is clearly and explicitly limited to judgeship. That very limited delegation, furthermore, is conditional, as it depends on the jurist's safety from potential harm from non-ShiÝi groups and powers.
This explains why the jurists do not, in the view of al-Shaykh MufÐd, play many roles during the absence of the Imam. Their chief duties are purely religious, such as interpretation of the texts and teaching or preaching; and they are, like other members of the community, not permitted to enjoin good and forbid evil through force. The management of khums is not in the hands of the jurists in MufÐd's view, a very great difference from the later moment of niyÁbah when it is understood by some to be a state tax needing to be administrated by an Islamic government. MufÐd's full opinion on the Friday congregational prayer, which is also conventionally linked to politics, remains unclear. What is evident at least is that delegacy in his view does not include leadership of the Friday prayer, although he does not say why he excludes that prayer from the list of those that can be led by the jurists.
In the early moment of niyÁbah, the religious leaders of the ShiÝi community, i.e. the jurists, possess charisma, but not political charisma. The sources of their charisma are knowledge, their appointment by the Imams through certain traditions and doctrines, and their personal characteristics. The first two are found in every well-educated jurist, while the third differs from one to the other. It is not clear if the ShiÝis expected their religious leaders to be politically active, but the leaders themselves were certainly reluctant to play that role. Leading figures did have the ability to mobilize people, gather a following, or construct a political charisma, but they chose not to. This is in stark contrast to the third moment.
MufÐd's interpretation of niyÁbah has had two contradictory results in ShiÝi thought. On the one hand, he provided a privatized, apolitical interpretation of ShiÝism and consequently deputyship, an interpretation that lasted a very long time. His influence has been tremendous. He focused on private affairs such as prayers, fasting, alms, and commercial law, while refraining from addressing public matters such as the state or the army. As a consequence, the ShiÝi ulema neither theorized nor claimed political authority through deputyship in the early centuries of the greater occultation. On the other hand, MufÐd's thought also opened the way for a political interpretation of deputyship many centuries later. He justified working for a non-ShiÝi political system using an atomistic approach, making it equivalent, when the terms were fulfilled, to working for the Imam himself. When the jurists found themselves in a better, less politically constricted situation, his formulation opened the way to them considering collaboration with a non-ShiÝi system or even establishing a state themselves. After MufÐd, many prominent figures such as al-MurtaÃÁ, NaÒÐr al-DÐn al-ÓÙsÐ, ÝAllÁmah ÍillÐ, and KarakÐ and others under the Safavids associated with the state recognized and cooperated with state authority. Those who refused the idea that one can work with an 'unjust' ruler belonged mostly to the quietist stream of the tradition, save some in modern Iran such as Ayatollah Khomeini who rejected working for those in power in order to establish a state themselves. Even Ayatollah Khomeini's arguments for establishing an Islamic state are quite similar to those of MufÐd justifying working for an oppressive ruler. In Ayatollah Khomeini's view, an Islamic state is needed for religious laws to be enforced and Muslim interests to be secured, while for MufÐd, the same considerations permit the jurists to collaborate with those he considers to be 'oppressors'. What made figures subsequent to MufÐd, including Ayatollah Khomeini, different from him was the different contexts in which they lived.
In brief, in his works, MufÐd has clarified issues regarding the authority of ShiÝi jurists and amirs. First, during the presence of the Imam, his appointees are his legitimate delegates, that is the jurists and amirs. Second, when there is a dominant non-ShiÝi state, the jurists judge among the ShiÝis and can work for an unjust ruler. Third, the ShiÝi amirs can work for a non-ShiÝi political system while the legitimacy of their work steams from the Imam's permission, like the case of the jurists. Forth, MufÐd remains silent on the question of establishing an independent rulership by ShiÝi jurists, and whether or not it would be considered legitimate. While the jurists and the amirs are equally legitimate appointees of the Imam for enforcing QurÞÁnic punishments (ÎudÙd), questions remain. During the occultation, did ShiÝi scholars only focus on delegacy and the legitimate authority of the jurists in the judicial field, or politics as well? Why did they exclude the amirs, given that they had been introduced as the Imam's representative regarding administration of the people affairs? These are areas of muchneeded research. 
